👉 No Peace Without Justice And Accountability / ፍትህና ተጠያቂነት ከሌለ ሰላም የለም 👈
😈 ክፉዎች ርኅራኄ ቢደረግላቸው እንኳ፣ ጽድቅን አይማሩም
💭 “የኢትዮጵያ ችግር ኦሮሞ ነዉ ፥ የኦሮሞ ችግርም ኢትዮጵያ ናት” ዶ/ር ገመቹ መገርሳ
ከዚህ በፊት ሃያ ስምንት የኢትዮጵያ ጎሳዎችን እና ነገዶችን ከምድረገጽ ያጠፋው ጽንፈኛ ጋላ-ኦሮሞ በጥንታዊው የኢትዮጵያ መስራች ክርስቲያን ሕዝብ ላይ ጀነሳይድ እየፈጸመ ነው። እንዴት ነው ወገን ይህን ለይቶ ማወቅ የተሳነው/የማይፈልገው?
ቍ. ፩ ጠላቶቻችን ጋላ-ኦሮሞ ከእርሱ ጋር የሚሠሩት የከሃዲው ዳግማዊ ምንሊክ የመጨረሻ ትውልድ ኢ-አማኒያን፣ ፕሮቴስታንት እና ኢስላም ቡድኖችና ግለሰቦች ናቸው!
'የፕሬቶሪያ ስምምነት' እነዚህ ቆሻሾች በጋራ በሚፈጽሙት ጀነሳይድ እራሳቸውን ከፍትሕ እና ተጠያቂነት የማምለጫ ስምምነት ነው። እንዴት ነው ወገን ይህን መገንዘብ የተሳነው/የማይፈልገው? ያው እኮ ቆሻሻዎቹ ሙስሊሞች ኢሳያስ አፈወርቂ አብደላ-ሃሰን ወደ ሳውዲ፣ ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ ወደ ኤሚራት እና ኢራን፣ ጌታቸው ረዳ፣ ዛሬ ደግሞ 'ጄነራል' ታደሰ ወረደ ወደ አዲስ አበባ እየተመላለሱ ነው። አሁን ደግሞ እግዚአብሔር በጭራሽ አይፈቅድላቸውም እንጂ በድጋሚ በብዙ ሚሊየን ወገናችንን በጥይትም፣ በረሃብና በሽታም ለመጨረሽ በመዘጋጀት ላይ ናቸው።ተልዕኳቸው ክርስቲያኑን ሕዝባችንን ጨርሰው በውጩ ዓለም ኑሮ ያልተሳካላቸውን ኢ-አማኒያን የሉሲፈራውያኑ ወኪሎች ወደ ትግራይ አምጥቶ እና ትግራይን ከኤርትራ ጋር ቀላቅሎ አክሱማዊቷ ኢትዮጵያን ማጥፋት ስለሆነ ነው። ይህን ግልጽ የሆነ ዲያብሎሳዊ ዓላማቸውንና ተልዕኳቸውን ከፈጸሙ በኋላ በሦስተኛው ሂደት ሺባዎቹ እነ ደብረ ሲዖል ገብሬ፣ ታደሰ ወረደ፣ ፈትለወርቅ ገብሬ ወዘተ ወደ አዲስ አበባው ጫካ ፕሮጀክት አምርተው ከከሃዲ አጋሮቻቸው ከእነ ጻድቃን፣ ጌታቸው ረዳ፣ አረጋዊ በርሄ፣ ኬርያ ኢብራሂም፣ አርኽበ እቍባይ፣ ሳሙራ ዩኑስ ወዘተ ጋር ይቀላቀላሉ። በትግራይ ያስቀሯቸውን ምልምሎቻቸውን ደግሞ፤ “ትግራይ ተገንጥላለች!” ብለው እንዲያውጁ ያደረጓቸዋል። ለ ፍትሕ እና ተጠያቂነት የማይሰሩት ለዚህ ነው! በጎ የሆነ እና የተቀደሰ ዓላማ ቢኖራቸውማ፣ ከተፈጸመው ግፍና በደል የተነሳ ብቻ እንኳን ኢትዮጵያን ተረክበው ለብዙ ሺህ ዓመታት መምራት የሚገባቸው ከትግራይ ክፍለሃገር የወጡ ወገኖች ብቻ መሆን ነበረባቸው። ልክ በሩዋንዳ ቁጥራቸው አናሳ የሆኑት የእነ ካጋሜ ቱትሲዎች እንዳደረጉት። ባያምኑበት እንኳን፣ 'ኢትዮጵያ! ኢትዮጵያ! እያለ 'የኢትዮጵያ እና ኢትዮጵያዊነት ካርድን' መጨዋት የነበረበት ከትግራይ የወጣ ወገን እንጂ ዛሬ በባዕዳውያኑ በእነ ሕንዱ ናሬንድራ ሞዲ በኩል ኮንዶም ተጠቅሞ በሞኙ ሕዝብ ላይ እንደገና ለመጫወት የሚሞክረው ቆሻሻ ጋላ-ኦሮሞ ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ አሊ በጭራሽ መሆን አልነበረበትም። ከባድሜው በክርስቲያን ሕዝባችን ላይ ካነጣጠረው የዘር ማጥፋት ዘመቻ በኋላ እባቡ ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ ከጂኒ ሚስቱ ዝናሽ ጋር በትግራይ ለሰባት ዓመታት ያህል እንዲኖሩ እና የትግራይን ሕዝብ እንዲያጠና የተደረገበትም አንዱ ምክኒያት ይህ ነበር።
የከሃዲዎቹ እና ወንጀለኞቹ ሕወሓቶች ተልዕኮ ግን ዛሬ ግልጽ ነው። ይህም አክሱማዊቷን ኢትዮጵያን እና ተዋሕዶ ክርስቲያን ሕዝቧን ለሉሲፈራውያኑ ሲሉ ማጥፋት ነው፤ ኢሳያስ አፈወርቂ አብደላ-ሃሰን እና አረብ አጋሮቹ በኤርትራ፣ ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ እና ጋላ-ኦሮሞ፣ ኦሮማራ፣ አማራ አጋሮቹ በኦሮሚያ ሲዖል እና በደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ እያደረጉት እንዳሉት።
አይይይ! እናንተ ከሃዲ የሰይጣን ጭፍሮች ገና ምን አይታችሁ፣ ስጋዊ ሞታችሁን ትፈልጓታላችሁ፤ ግን አታገኟትም፤ ገና በቁማችሁ ሲዖልን ትተዋቀቋታላችሁ!
👹 የገሃነም እሳት እራቶች በዋናነት፤
• አብዮት አህመድ አሊ
• ዝናሽ ታያቸው
• ብርሃኑ ጂኒ ጁላ
• ሌንጮ ባቲ
• እባብ ዱላ ገመዳ
• ሽመልስ እብዱሳ
• እዳነች እባቤ
• ጃዋር ጂኒ መሀመድ
• ብርሃኑ ነጋ
• እስክንድር ነጋ
• ስብሐት ነጋ
• ጌታቸው ረዳ
• ጻድቃን 'ከማን ጋር ነው የምንደራድረው?!'
• ፈትለወርቅ ገብሬ
• ደብረ ሲዖል ገብሬ
• ኢሳያስ አፈቆርኪ አብደላ-ሃሰን
👉 Courtesy: ETHIOPIA INSIGHT, by Gidey Amare, 17 December, 2025
A policy sold as reform entrenches the fascist Oromo Regim’s control over the investigation of crimes it’s accused of committing.
When the Pretoria Agreement was signed in November 2022, it offered a sliver of hope that accountability might follow the war in Tigray .
It pledged a “comprehensive national transitional justice policy” built through public consultations and processes aimed at truth, redress, reconciliation, and healing. That language implied openness, plurality, and a willingness to confront the past honestly.
In practice, the opposite has unfolded.
The provision of the Pretoria Agreement, particularly regarding transitional justice, lacked credibility from the outset. The agreement placed the design and execution of the process under the fascist Oromo Islamic regime of Ethiopia, a party which has committed many of the horrendous crimes and violations.
The expectation was unclear. Were the mediators, observers, and agreeing parties seriously expecting individuals or institutions that committed crimes to investigate themselves and admit their own guilt? This makes no legal sense whatsoever. This wasn’t something to be considered lightly—unless there was a deliberate attempt to downplay or obscure the atrocities committed in Tigray .
The federal government then did not take necessary steps including the involvement of the signatory party, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front, and consulting with the communities seeking justice.
Tigray Interim Administration expressed its concern that the process was unacceptable, insisting that its participation be on equal footing with the fascist Oromo Islamic Regime.
However, despite these concerns and substantial critiques from victim groups, opposition parties, civil society organizations, and specialists, the Justice Ministry held validation workshops in February 2024 to address the country’s violent past.
The Council of Ministers approved the draft policy two months later. The government then produced a transitional justice roadmap document, released in August of the same year.
Broken Foundations
Presented as a framework for peace, justice, and reconciliation, it now faces a legitimacy deficit. Tigray ’s interim administration rejected the process as it was designed and controlled by federal authorities in contradiction of Pretoria’s spirit.
The distrust is rooted in painful experience. Meaningful transitional justice requires a minimal level of political will, institutional independence, and safety for participants, yet the policy excludes international experts even in an advisory role.
The gap between the policy’s language and Ethiopia’s realities is stark. Federal authorities rely on sanitizing narratives that recast atrocities as part of a “law enforcement operation”, dismiss verified evidence, and restrict access to independent investigators.
Transitional justice presupposes a commitment to building trust and achieving reconciliation, yet the federal government allows officials such as Colonel Demeke Zewdu, identified in reports as a suspect in mass atrocities in Western Tigray , to remain in senior roles.
Before even attempting transitional justice, the government should have fully implemented the Pretoria Agreement, demonstrating real commitment to process. Yet it has shown no willingness to restore Tigray ’s territories to the prewar status quo, ensure the voluntary, safe, and secure return of IDPs, or allow independent investigations into all crimes. This failure is a primary driver of ongoing conflict.
This was further reinforced by the recent budget freeze and the freezing of bank accounts owned by the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). Coupled with fuel supply cuts, these measures were designed not only to economically strangle Tigray but also to provoke renewed conflict in clear violation of the peace agreement.
Worst of all, in another blatant violation of Pretoria, the federal government has started supporting forces intent on undermining peace and stability in Tigray , endangering civilians and jeopardizing the fragile process of reconciliation.
Under such conditions, profound mistrust exists. This makes any engagement with state institutions unimaginable for survivors. For those who have endured grave abuses, these institutions are not seen as avenues for justice but as extensions of the very structures that enabled their suffering.
The government’s track record reinforces accusations that it invoked transitional justice as a political tool to evade international pressure and to give external actors the impression that it abides by human rights policies—an excuse to resume relations with Ethiopia.
Systemic Obstacles
The government’s choices only deepen skepticism about Eritrea’s involvement in the war.
Given its international dimension, this issue cannot be resolved through domestic transitional justice. What is troubling but unsurprising is that Ethiopia’s proposed framework provides no credible route for addressing violations and abuses attributed to the Eritrean Defense Forces.
More striking is the omission of viable alternatives, including pursuing legal action against Eritrea through the International Court of Justice. Sidestepping such avenues suggests that the goal is not accountability but a face-saving closure that leaves core crimes untouched.
Its reliance on extradition as the primary avenue for accountability is especially unconvincing.
Experts have noted that during the Derg trials most exiled defendants were tried in absentia because the state failed to secure their return from host countries, underscoring how ineffective this path has been in Ethiopia’s own history.
Furthermore, the proposed prosecutorial mechanism appears crafted to contain accountability rather than enable it. The policy confines criminal trials to a special chamber housed within the judiciary, an institution widely regarded as politicized, and limits prosecutions to “high-level perpetrators” of “serious” systematic violations.
Such a design invites doubt. Federal authorities have repeatedly intervened in politically charged cases, and these patterns make it difficult to imagine that a court operating under the same mandate—without any form of international oversight—could act with genuine independence.
At the same time, the decision to focus exclusively on senior figures heightens fears that the community-level violence that defined the Tigray an experience will be sidelined, leaving mid- and lower-level perpetrators beyond meaningful scrutiny and reducing the legal record to a narrow, sanitized account of the war.
These weaknesses exist alongside continuing obstruction.
Numerous independent investigations, including those of the dismantled International Commission of Human Rights Experts on Ethiopia (ICHREE), found reasonable grounds to believe that atrocities amounting to genocide may have occurred.
Yet authorities maintain control over evidence, restrict access to sites, and offer no credible witness protection. Testifying under these conditions exposes survivors to real danger.
Moreover, the policy’s approach to truth-telling compounds its problems. By granting the Truth Commission a mandate reaching back to 1995, it encourages selective case-building that can be steered toward political convenience rather than historical clarity.
Such elasticity fosters contestation rather than shared understanding and risks transforming the process into yet another arena for political maneuvering.
These problems are not solvable through technical adjustments. They reflect a configuration in which the state acts as the architect and arbiter of a system meant to assess its own conduct.
Misleading Analogies
Defenders of the policy often turn to comparative experiences, citing transitions where justice moved forward under imperfect conditions.
The analogies do not hold.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioned in a context where both the ANC and remnants of the National Party retained influence, but only under constant international scrutiny and enforceable external guarantees.
Mozambique’s reconciliation process unfolded while FRELIMO and RENAMO remained politically relevant, but it, too, benefited from sustained outside support.
Timor-Leste’s hybrid UN-backed model demonstrated how international oversight can compensate for weak domestic capacity.
In every one of these cases, transitional justice advanced not because perpetrators remained powerful, but because independent investigations, external monitoring, and international pressure were present.
None of these conditions exist in Ethiopia. The authorities of the fascist Oromo Regime maintain complete control over security, prosecution, and narrative production, with no external actor empowered to enforce standards or guarantee safety.
The international community’s reluctance to re-establish an investigative mechanism after ICHREE’s termination has further entrenched this asymmetry. Calls for “national ownership” have devolved into a rationale for international disengagement.
Credible Alternatives
The present policy cannot deliver justice for Tigray .
A viable approach requires recognition that institutions implicated in violations cannot credibly adjudicate them. Independent investigation must be restored under a renewed UN mandate with full access to sites, evidence, and witnesses.
Survivors and witnesses need a protection system administered beyond the reach of Ethiopian security agencies. All transitional justice processes, including enforcement mechanisms established by the federal government, should operate under joint authority and close scrutiny of international supervision.
International criminal accountability mechanisms, including further action by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, must be pursued where domestic systems demonstrate unwillingness or inability.
Diplomatic and financial engagement by external partners should be conditioned on demonstrable cooperation with independent investigative processes and non-interference in evidence-gathering.
