https://rumble.com/v7368jq-ethiopia-why-transitional-justice-for-genocide-plagued-tigray-is-a-fiction.html
https://youtu.be/26P-GUnjLiY
👉 No Peace Without Justice And Accountability /
ፍትህና ተጠያቂነት
ከሌለ ሰላም የለም 👈
😈 ክፉዎች
ርኅራኄ ቢደረግላቸው እንኳ፣ ጽድቅን አይማሩም
💭
“የኢትዮጵያ
ችግር ኦሮሞ ነዉ ፥ የኦሮሞ ችግርም ኢትዮጵያ
ናት” ዶ/ር
ገመቹ መገርሳ
ከዚህ
በፊት ሃያ ስምንት የኢትዮጵያ ጎሳዎችን እና
ነገዶችን ከምድረገጽ ያጠፋው ጽንፈኛ ጋላ-ኦሮሞ
በጥንታዊው የኢትዮጵያ መስራች ክርስቲያን
ሕዝብ ላይ ጀነሳይድ እየፈጸመ ነው። እንዴት
ነው ወገን ይህን ለይቶ ማወቅ የተሳነው/የማይፈልገው?
ቍ.
፩
ጠላቶቻችን ጋላ-ኦሮሞ
ከእርሱ ጋር የሚሠሩት የከሃዲው ዳግማዊ ምንሊክ
የመጨረሻ ትውልድ ኢ-አማኒያን፣
ፕሮቴስታንት እና ኢስላም ቡድኖችና ግለሰቦች
ናቸው!
'የፕሬቶሪያ
ስምምነት'
እነዚህ
ቆሻሾች በጋራ በሚፈጽሙት ጀነሳይድ እራሳቸውን
ከፍትሕ እና ተጠያቂነት የማምለጫ ስምምነት
ነው። እንዴት ነው ወገን ይህን መገንዘብ
የተሳነው/የማይፈልገው?
ያው
እኮ ቆሻሻዎቹ ሙስሊሞች ኢሳያስ አፈወርቂ
አብደላ-ሃሰን
ወደ ሳውዲ፣ ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ ወደ ኤሚራት
እና ኢራን፣ ጌታቸው ረዳ፣ ዛሬ ደግሞ 'ጄነራል'
ታደሰ
ወረደ ወደ አዲስ አበባ እየተመላለሱ ነው።
አሁን ደግሞ እግዚአብሔር በጭራሽ አይፈቅድላቸውም
እንጂ በድጋሚ በብዙ ሚሊየን ወገናችንን
በጥይትም፣ በረሃብና በሽታም ለመጨረሽ
በመዘጋጀት ላይ ናቸው።ተልዕኳቸው ክርስቲያኑን
ሕዝባችንን ጨርሰው በውጩ ዓለም ኑሮ ያልተሳካላቸውን
ኢ-አማኒያን
የሉሲፈራውያኑ ወኪሎች ወደ ትግራይ አምጥቶ
እና ትግራይን ከኤርትራ ጋር ቀላቅሎ አክሱማዊቷ
ኢትዮጵያን ማጥፋት ስለሆነ ነው። ይህን ግልጽ
የሆነ ዲያብሎሳዊ ዓላማቸውንና ተልዕኳቸውን
ከፈጸሙ በኋላ በሦስተኛው ሂደት ሺባዎቹ እነ
ደብረ ሲዖል ገብሬ፣ ታደሰ ወረደ፣ ፈትለወርቅ
ገብሬ ወዘተ ወደ አዲስ አበባው ጫካ ፕሮጀክት
አምርተው ከከሃዲ አጋሮቻቸው ከእነ ጻድቃን፣
ጌታቸው ረዳ፣ አረጋዊ በርሄ፣ ኬርያ ኢብራሂም፣
አርኽበ እቍባይ፣ ሳሙራ ዩኑስ ወዘተ ጋር
ይቀላቀላሉ። በትግራይ ያስቀሯቸውን ምልምሎቻቸውን
ደግሞ፤ “ትግራይ ተገንጥላለች!”
ብለው
እንዲያውጁ ያደረጓቸዋል። ለ ፍትሕ እና
ተጠያቂነት የማይሰሩት ለዚህ ነው!
በጎ
የሆነ እና የተቀደሰ ዓላማ ቢኖራቸውማ፣
ከተፈጸመው ግፍና በደል የተነሳ ብቻ እንኳን
ኢትዮጵያን ተረክበው ለብዙ ሺህ ዓመታት መምራት
የሚገባቸው ከትግራይ ክፍለሃገር የወጡ ወገኖች
ብቻ መሆን ነበረባቸው። ልክ በሩዋንዳ ቁጥራቸው
አናሳ የሆኑት የእነ ካጋሜ ቱትሲዎች እንዳደረጉት።
ባያምኑበት እንኳን፣ 'ኢትዮጵያ!
ኢትዮጵያ!
እያለ
'የኢትዮጵያ
እና ኢትዮጵያዊነት ካርድን'
መጨዋት
የነበረበት ከትግራይ የወጣ ወገን እንጂ ዛሬ
በባዕዳውያኑ በእነ ሕንዱ ናሬንድራ ሞዲ በኩል
ኮንዶም ተጠቅሞ በሞኙ ሕዝብ ላይ እንደገና
ለመጫወት የሚሞክረው ቆሻሻ ጋላ-ኦሮሞ
ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ አሊ በጭራሽ መሆን
አልነበረበትም። ከባድሜው በክርስቲያን
ሕዝባችን ላይ ካነጣጠረው የዘር ማጥፋት ዘመቻ
በኋላ እባቡ ግራኝ አብዮት አህመድ ከጂኒ ሚስቱ
ዝናሽ ጋር በትግራይ ለሰባት ዓመታት ያህል
እንዲኖሩ እና የትግራይን ሕዝብ እንዲያጠና
የተደረገበትም አንዱ ምክኒያት ይህ ነበር።
የከሃዲዎቹ
እና ወንጀለኞቹ ሕወሓቶች ተልዕኮ ግን ዛሬ
ግልጽ ነው። ይህም አክሱማዊቷን ኢትዮጵያን
እና ተዋሕዶ ክርስቲያን ሕዝቧን ለሉሲፈራውያኑ
ሲሉ ማጥፋት ነው፤ ኢሳያስ አፈወርቂ አብደላ-ሃሰን
እና አረብ አጋሮቹ በኤርትራ፣ ግራኝ አብዮት
አህመድ እና ጋላ-ኦሮሞ፣
ኦሮማራ፣ አማራ አጋሮቹ በኦሮሚያ ሲዖል እና
በደቡብ ኢትዮጵያ እያደረጉት እንዳሉት።
አይይይ!
እናንተ
ከሃዲ የሰይጣን ጭፍሮች
ገና ምን አይታችሁ፣
ስጋዊ
ሞታችሁን ትፈልጓታላችሁ፤ ግን አታገኟትም፤
ገና በቁማችሁ ሲዖልን ትተዋቀቋታላችሁ!
👹 የገሃነም
እሳት እራቶች በዋናነት፤
• አብዮት
አህመድ አሊ
• ዝናሽ
ታያቸው
• ብርሃኑ
ጂኒ ጁላ
• ሌንጮ
ባቲ
• እባብ
ዱላ ገመዳ
• ሽመልስ
እብዱሳ
• እዳነች
እባቤ
• ጃዋር
ጂኒ መሀመድ
• ብርሃኑ
ነጋ
• እስክንድር
ነጋ
• ስብሐት
ነጋ
• ጌታቸው
ረዳ
• ጻድቃን
'ከማን
ጋር ነው የምንደራድረው?!'
• ፈትለወርቅ
ገብሬ
• ደብረ
ሲዖል ገብሬ
• ኢሳያስ
አፈቆርኪ አብደላ-ሃሰን
👉 Courtesy: ETHIOPIA
INSIGHT, by Gidey Amare, 17 December, 2025
A policy sold as reform entrenches the fascist Oromo Regim’s
control over the investigation of crimes it’s accused of
committing.
When the Pretoria Agreement was signed in November 2022, it offered a
sliver of hope that accountability might follow the war in Tigray .
It pledged a “comprehensive national transitional justice policy”
built through public consultations and processes aimed at truth,
redress, reconciliation, and healing. That language implied openness,
plurality, and a willingness to confront the past honestly.
In practice,
the opposite has unfolded.
The provision of the Pretoria Agreement, particularly regarding
transitional justice, lacked credibility from the outset. The
agreement placed the design and execution of the process under the
fascist Oromo Islamic regime of Ethiopia, a party which has committed
many of the horrendous crimes and violations.
The expectation was unclear. Were the mediators, observers, and
agreeing parties seriously expecting individuals or institutions that
committed crimes to investigate themselves and admit their own guilt?
This makes no legal sense whatsoever. This wasn’t something to be
considered lightly—unless there was a deliberate attempt to
downplay or obscure the atrocities committed in Tigray .
The federal government then did not take necessary steps including
the involvement of the signatory party, the Tigray People’s
Liberation Front, and consulting with the communities seeking
justice.
Tigray Interim Administration expressed its concern that the process
was unacceptable, insisting that its participation be on equal
footing with the fascist Oromo Islamic Regime.
However, despite these concerns and substantial critiques from victim
groups, opposition parties, civil society organizations, and
specialists, the Justice Ministry held validation workshops in
February 2024 to address the country’s violent past.
The Council of Ministers approved the draft policy two months later.
The government then produced a transitional justice roadmap document,
released in August of the same year.
Broken
Foundations
Presented as a framework for peace, justice, and reconciliation, it
now faces a legitimacy deficit. Tigray ’s interim administration
rejected the process as it was designed and controlled by federal
authorities in contradiction of Pretoria’s spirit.
The distrust is rooted in painful experience. Meaningful transitional
justice requires a minimal level of political will, institutional
independence, and safety for participants, yet the policy excludes
international experts even in an advisory role.
The gap between the policy’s language and Ethiopia’s realities is
stark. Federal authorities rely on sanitizing narratives that recast
atrocities as part of a “law enforcement operation”, dismiss
verified evidence, and restrict access to independent investigators.
Transitional justice presupposes a commitment to building trust and
achieving reconciliation, yet the federal government allows officials
such as Colonel Demeke Zewdu, identified in reports as a suspect in
mass atrocities in Western Tigray , to remain in senior roles.
Before even attempting transitional justice, the government should
have fully implemented the Pretoria Agreement, demonstrating real
commitment to process. Yet it has shown no willingness to restore
Tigray ’s territories to the prewar status quo, ensure the
voluntary, safe, and secure return of IDPs, or allow independent
investigations into all crimes. This failure is a primary driver of
ongoing conflict.
This was further reinforced by the recent budget freeze and the
freezing of bank accounts owned by the Endowment Fund for the
Rehabilitation of Tigray (EFFORT). Coupled with fuel supply cuts,
these measures were designed not only to economically strangle Tigray
but also to provoke renewed conflict in clear violation of the peace
agreement.
Worst of all, in another blatant violation of Pretoria, the federal
government has started supporting forces intent on undermining peace
and stability in Tigray , endangering civilians and jeopardizing the
fragile process of reconciliation.
Under such conditions, profound mistrust exists. This makes any
engagement with state institutions unimaginable for survivors. For
those who have endured grave abuses, these institutions are not seen
as avenues for justice but as extensions of the very structures that
enabled their suffering.
The government’s track record reinforces accusations that it
invoked transitional justice as a political tool to evade
international pressure and to give external actors the impression
that it abides by human rights policies—an excuse to resume
relations with Ethiopia.
Systemic
Obstacles
The government’s choices only deepen skepticism about Eritrea’s
involvement in the war.
Given its international dimension, this issue cannot be resolved
through domestic transitional justice. What is troubling but
unsurprising is that Ethiopia’s proposed framework provides no
credible route for addressing violations and abuses attributed to the
Eritrean Defense Forces.
More striking is the omission of viable alternatives, including
pursuing legal action against Eritrea through the International Court
of Justice. Sidestepping such avenues suggests that the goal is not
accountability but a face-saving closure that leaves core crimes
untouched.
Its reliance on extradition as the primary avenue for accountability
is especially unconvincing.
Experts have noted that during the Derg trials most exiled defendants
were tried in absentia because the state failed to secure their
return from host countries, underscoring how ineffective this path
has been in Ethiopia’s own history.
Furthermore, the proposed prosecutorial mechanism appears crafted to
contain accountability rather than enable it. The policy confines
criminal trials to a special chamber housed within the judiciary, an
institution widely regarded as politicized, and limits prosecutions
to “high-level perpetrators” of “serious” systematic
violations.
Such a design invites doubt. Federal authorities have repeatedly
intervened in politically charged cases, and these patterns make it
difficult to imagine that a court operating under the same
mandate—without any form of international oversight—could act
with genuine independence.
At the same time, the decision to focus exclusively on senior figures
heightens fears that the community-level violence that defined the
Tigray an experience will be sidelined, leaving mid- and lower-level
perpetrators beyond meaningful scrutiny and reducing the legal record
to a narrow, sanitized account of the war.
These
weaknesses exist alongside continuing obstruction.
Numerous independent investigations, including those of the
dismantled International Commission of Human Rights Experts on
Ethiopia (ICHREE), found reasonable grounds to believe that
atrocities amounting to genocide may have occurred.
Yet authorities maintain control over evidence, restrict access to
sites, and offer no credible witness protection. Testifying under
these conditions exposes survivors to real danger.
Moreover, the policy’s approach to truth-telling compounds its
problems. By granting the Truth Commission a mandate reaching back to
1995, it encourages selective case-building that can be steered
toward political convenience rather than historical clarity.
Such elasticity fosters contestation rather than shared understanding
and risks transforming the process into yet another arena for
political maneuvering.
These problems are not solvable through technical adjustments. They
reflect a configuration in which the state acts as the architect and
arbiter of a system meant to assess its own conduct.
Misleading
Analogies
Defenders of the policy often turn to comparative experiences, citing
transitions where justice moved forward under imperfect conditions.
The analogies do not hold.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission functioned in a
context where both the ANC and remnants of the National Party
retained influence, but only under constant international scrutiny
and enforceable external guarantees.
Mozambique’s reconciliation process unfolded while FRELIMO and
RENAMO remained politically relevant, but it, too, benefited from
sustained outside support.
Timor-Leste’s hybrid UN-backed model demonstrated how international
oversight can compensate for weak domestic capacity.
In every one of these cases, transitional justice advanced not
because perpetrators remained powerful, but because independent
investigations, external monitoring, and international pressure were
present.
None of these conditions exist in Ethiopia. The authorities of the
fascist Oromo Regime maintain complete control over security,
prosecution, and narrative production, with no external actor
empowered to enforce standards or guarantee safety.
The international community’s reluctance to re-establish an
investigative mechanism after ICHREE’s termination has further
entrenched this asymmetry. Calls for “national ownership” have
devolved into a rationale for international disengagement.
Credible
Alternatives
The present policy cannot deliver justice for Tigray .
A viable approach requires recognition that institutions implicated
in violations cannot credibly adjudicate them. Independent
investigation must be restored under a renewed UN mandate with full
access to sites, evidence, and witnesses.
Survivors and witnesses need a protection system administered beyond
the reach of Ethiopian security agencies. All transitional justice
processes, including enforcement mechanisms established by the
federal government, should operate under joint authority and close
scrutiny of international supervision.
International criminal accountability mechanisms, including further
action by the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, must be
pursued where domestic systems demonstrate unwillingness or
inability.
Diplomatic and financial engagement by external partners should be
conditioned on demonstrable cooperation with independent
investigative processes and non-interference in evidence-gathering.